Belief integration in action: A defense of extended beliefs

Autor(en): Kyselo, Miriam
Walter, Sven 
Stichwörter: Belief and Action; Belief Integration; BOUNDS; CONSCIOUSNESS; DYNAMIC-SYSTEMS; Ethics; Extended Cognition; Extended Mind; MODELING BELIEF; Psychology; Psychology, Multidisciplinary; Social Sciences - Other Topics
Erscheinungsdatum: 2011
Herausgeber: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Journal: PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Volumen: 24
Ausgabe: 2
Startseite: 245
Seitenende: 260
Zusammenfassung: 
Daniel Weiskopf has recently raised an apparently powerful objection against the so-called ``extended mind thesis'' with regard to beliefs. His argument is that since alleged cases of ``extended beliefs'' lack a characteristic feature of beliefs properly so called (newly acquired beliefs are usually integrated with already existing beliefs rapidly, automatically and unconsciously), they do not count as genuine beliefs properly so called. We defend the extended mind thesis by arguing that Weiskopf is wrong. First, we suggest an alternative account of informational integration that is compatible with externally stored beliefs' being beliefs properly so called, emphasizes the crucial role action plays for cognition, and stresses the embodied and situationally embedded nature of human cognizers. Second, we argue that even if informational integration were usually rapid, automatic, and unconscious, this would not be an essential feature of beliefs. Third, we argue that even if rapid, automatic, and unconscious informational integration were characteristic of our commonsense conception of beliefs, externally stored ``beliefs'' would still be sufficiently similar to beliefs properly so called for them to be grouped together for all practical and scientific purposes.
ISSN: 09515089
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2010.547987

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