If 0=1, then a `pure `Inhaltslogik' is impossible. Comments on Liske's critique of Leibniz's theory of concepts

Autor(en): Lenzen, W
Stichwörter: Philosophy
Erscheinungsdatum: 2000
Herausgeber: FRANZ STEINER VERLAG GMBH
Journal: STUDIA LEIBNITIANA
Volumen: 32
Ausgabe: 1
Startseite: 105
Seitenende: 116
Zusammenfassung: 
In a 1994 paper entitled `Ist eine reine Inhaltslogik moglich?' M. Liske attempted to show that Leibniz's theory of intensional concepts suffers from a serious inadequacy. Liske begins by defining the intension of a concept in two slightly different ways. Broadly conceived, Int(A) is the set of all concepts B which are contained in A, while in a narrow sense, Int*(A) consists of all such B other than A itself. These definitions entail that the tautological concept 0 has an empty intension in the narrow sense, i.e. Int*(0)=phi, while Int(0)=(0). Furthermore it follows (in conjunction with certain unproblematic assumptions about the intensions of negative concepts in general) that the intension* of a negated individual-concept also is empty. And from this Liske concludes that the intensions* of all negative concepts must be empty. This, however, is a fallacy which rests upon conflating the empty set, phi, with the non-empty set (phi), which contains phi as its only element.
ISSN: 00393185

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