Emotions as pragmatic and epistemic actions

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWilutzky, Wendy
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-23T15:57:24Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-23T15:57:24Z-
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn16641078
dc.identifier.urihttps://osnascholar.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/unios/2905-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the idea that emotions in social contexts and their intentionality may be conceived of as pragmatic or epistemic actions. That is, emotions are often aimed at achieving certain goals within a social context, so that they resemble pragmatic actions; and in other cases emotions can be plausibly construed as acts of probing the social environment so as to extract or uncover important information, thus complying with the functions of epistemic actions (cf. Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). This view of emotions stands at odds with the wide held conception that emotions' intentionality can be cashed out in terms of representations of value. On such a position, emotions' intentionality has only a mind-to-world direction of fit while any world-to-mind direction of fit is deemed secondary or is even outrightly denied. However, acknowledging that emotions (qua actions) also have a world-to-mind direction fit has several advantages over the typical rendition of emotions as representations of value, such as accounting for emotions' sensitivity to contextual factors, variations in emotion expression and, importantly, assessing the appropriateness of emotional reactions. To substantiate this claim, several cases of emotions in social contexts are discussed, as the social dimension of emotions highlights that emotions are inherently ways of interacting with one's social environment. In sum, the construal of emotions in social contexts as pragmatic or epistemic actions yields a more fine-grained and accurate understanding of emotions' intentionality and their roles in social contexts than the insistence on a purely mind-to-world direction of fit.
dc.description.sponsorshipPool Frauenforderung of the University of Osnabruck; I am indebted to Achim Stephan for countless fruitful discussions and Michael Baumgartner for his diligent criticisms on an earlier version of this paper. I would also like to thank my two excellent reviewers for their very constructive comments. The work on this paper was supported by the Pool Frauenforderung of the University of Osnabruck.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherFRONTIERS MEDIA SA
dc.relation.ispartofFRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY
dc.subjectaction
dc.subjectcognitive science
dc.subjectemotions
dc.subjectEXPRESSION
dc.subjectphilosophy of emotions
dc.subjectphilosophy of mind
dc.subjectPsychology
dc.subjectPsychology, Multidisciplinary
dc.titleEmotions as pragmatic and epistemic actions
dc.typejournal article
dc.identifier.doi10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01593
dc.identifier.isiISI:000364126500001
dc.description.volume6
dc.publisher.placeAVENUE DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 34, LAUSANNE, CH-1015, SWITZERLAND
dcterms.isPartOf.abbreviationFront. Psychol.
dcterms.oaStatusGreen Published, gold
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