The Logical Form of Interventionism

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBaumgartner, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-23T15:59:59Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-23T15:59:59Z-
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn00483893
dc.identifier.urihttps://osnascholar.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/unios/4267-
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that, notwithstanding the remarkable popularity of Woodward's (2003) interventionist analysis of causation, the exact definitional details of that theory are surprisingly little understood. There exists a discrepancy in the literature between the insufficient appreciation of the logical details of interventionism, on the one hand, and the amount of theoretical work interventionism is expected to do, on the other. The first part of the paper distinguishes four significantly different readings of the logical form of Woodward's analysis and identifies the two readings that best capture Woodward's intentions in (2003) and (2008a), respectively. In the second part, I show that these different readings are not clearly kept apart in the literature, and, moreover, that neither of them can do all the work that interventionists would like the theory to do.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSPRINGER
dc.relation.ispartofPHILOSOPHIA
dc.subject`MAKING-THINGS-HAPPEN'
dc.subjectCausation
dc.subjectInterventionism
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectPhilosophy of science
dc.subjectWOODWARD
dc.titleThe Logical Form of Interventionism
dc.typejournal article
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11406-012-9369-2
dc.identifier.isiISI:000311676200007
dc.description.volume40
dc.description.issue4
dc.description.startpage751
dc.description.endpage761
dc.publisher.placeVAN GODEWIJCKSTRAAT 30, 3311 GZ DORDRECHT, NETHERLANDS
dcterms.isPartOf.abbreviationPhilosophia
dcterms.oaStatusGreen Submitted
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