The theory of social choice since 1951

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGaertner, W
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-23T16:00:18Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-23T16:00:18Z-
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier.issn00214027
dc.identifier.urihttps://osnascholar.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/unios/4321-
dc.description1996 SOR Meeting, BRAUNSCHWEIG, GERMANY, SEP 04-06, 1996
dc.description.abstractStarting point for our analysis is Arrow's famous impossibility result from 1951. Arrow had proved that within an ordinal framework no non-dictatorial social welfare function exists that satisfies the condition of unrestricted domain, the weak Pareto principle and the requirement of independence of irrelevant alternatives. In the first few sections, we discuss what kinds of positive results can be obtained once we relax one or the other of his axioms. The simple majority rule, for example, is an Arrow social welfare function under a domain restriction that is more general than single-peakedness. The Borda rule violates Arrow's independence axiom but satisfies a weak independence requirement together with some other rather attractive properties. We next look at preference domains that admit the existence of Arrovian social welfare functions, i.e. aggregation rules fulfilling both the Pareto and the independence condition and being non-dictatorial. We also characterize domains for non-manipulable voting procedures. The subsequent section analyzes social aggregation functions that allow for an interpersonal comparison of both utility levels and utility gains. Utilitarian rules and the Rawlsian lexicographic maximin principle are discussed in particular. We finally examine the exercise of individual rights within the social choice context, which means that non-utility information is considered as well.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherLUCIUS LUCIUS VERLAG MBH
dc.relation.ispartofJAHRBUCHER FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE UND STATISTIK
dc.subjectarrow social welfare functions
dc.subjectBusiness & Economics
dc.subjectDECISIONS
dc.subjectDOMAINS
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectindividual rights
dc.subjectmanipulability
dc.subjectMathematical Methods In Social Sciences
dc.subjectPREFERENCES
dc.subjectSocial Sciences, Mathematical Methods
dc.subjectutility comparisons
dc.subjectVOTING PROCEDURES
dc.subjectWELFARE FUNCTIONS
dc.titleThe theory of social choice since 1951
dc.typeconference paper
dc.identifier.isiISI:000077268900001
dc.description.volume217
dc.description.issue6
dc.description.startpage657
dc.description.endpage680
dc.publisher.placeGEROKSTR 51, D-70184 STUTTGART, GERMANY
dcterms.isPartOf.abbreviationJahrb. Natl. Okon. Stat.
Show simple item record

Google ScholarTM

Check