Asset ownership and the threat to sell

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorvon Lilienfeld-Toal, U
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-23T16:01:07Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-23T16:01:07Z-
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.issn09318658
dc.identifier.urihttps://osnascholar.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/unios/4780-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper the effects of selling assets are examined in a property rights model A la Grossmann, Hart and Moore. The possibility of selling an asset gives its owner a bargaining tool which can strengthen his bargaining power under certain circumstances. This offers a form of protection against opportunistic behavior in the hold-up problem, which has not yet been considered in the literature on property rights. With this model it is possible to give a rationale for unconditional joint ownership. Moreover, an explanation for privatization, outsourcing and the existence of ``passive'' outside owners can be derived within the model.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSPRINGER-VERLAG WIEN
dc.relation.ispartofJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE
dc.subjectbargaining
dc.subjectBENEFITS
dc.subjectBusiness & Economics
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectINCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
dc.subjectproperty rights
dc.subjectPROPERTY-RIGHTS
dc.subjectRENEGOTIATION
dc.titleAsset ownership and the threat to sell
dc.typejournal article
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00712-002-0608-z
dc.identifier.isiISI:000185485300001
dc.description.volume80
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.startpage1
dc.description.endpage25
dc.publisher.placeSACHSENPLATZ 4-6, PO BOX 89, A-1201 VIENNA, AUSTRIA
dcterms.isPartOf.abbreviationJ. Econ.-Z. Natl.okon.
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