Asset ownership and the threat to sell

Autor(en): von Lilienfeld-Toal, U
Stichwörter: bargaining; BENEFITS; Business & Economics; Economics; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; property rights; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; RENEGOTIATION
Erscheinungsdatum: 2003
Herausgeber: SPRINGER-VERLAG WIEN
Journal: JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE
Volumen: 80
Ausgabe: 1
Startseite: 1
Seitenende: 25
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper the effects of selling assets are examined in a property rights model A la Grossmann, Hart and Moore. The possibility of selling an asset gives its owner a bargaining tool which can strengthen his bargaining power under certain circumstances. This offers a form of protection against opportunistic behavior in the hold-up problem, which has not yet been considered in the literature on property rights. With this model it is possible to give a rationale for unconditional joint ownership. Moreover, an explanation for privatization, outsourcing and the existence of ``passive'' outside owners can be derived within the model.
ISSN: 09318658
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-002-0608-z

Show full item record

Page view(s)

1
Last Week
0
Last month
0
checked on May 19, 2024

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric