Rendering Interventionism and Non-Reductive Physicalism Compatible

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBaumgartner, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-23T16:01:36Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-23T16:01:36Z-
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn00122017
dc.identifier.urihttps://osnascholar.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/unios/5053-
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an interventionist turn'. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of non-reducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventionist exclusion argument showing that interventionism is in fact incompatible with non-reductive physicalism. In response, a number of revised versions of interventionism have been suggested that are compatible with non-reductive physicalism. The first part of this paper reconstructs the definitional details of these modified interventionist theories. The second part investigates whether the modification proposed in Woodward (2011) is not only compatible with, but moreover supports non-reductive physicalism. In particular, it is examined whether that newest variant of interventionism allows for empirically resolving the problem of causal exclusion as envisaged by Shapiro, Sober and others.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWILEY
dc.relation.ispartofDIALECTICA
dc.subjectDETERMINABLES
dc.subjectEXCLUSION
dc.subjectMENTAL CAUSATION
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleRendering Interventionism and Non-Reductive Physicalism Compatible
dc.typejournal article
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1746-8361.12008
dc.identifier.isiISI:000318163400001
dc.description.volume67
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.startpage1
dc.description.endpage27
dc.identifier.eissn17468361
dc.publisher.place111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA
dcterms.isPartOf.abbreviationDialectica
dcterms.oaStatusGreen Submitted
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