Epistemic evaluation and the need for `impure' epistemic standards

Autor(en): Kompa, Nikola Anna
Stichwörter: Epistemic standards; Functions of knowledge ascriptions; History & Philosophy Of Science; Nonindexical contextualism; Philosophy; Practical interests; Threshold problem; whose stakes? problem
Erscheinungsdatum: 2021
Herausgeber: SPRINGER
Volumen: 199
Ausgabe: 1-2
Startseite: 4673
Seitenende: 4693
That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.
ISSN: 00397857
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02996-3

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