Existential choices: to what degree is who we are a matter of choice?

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorVarga, Somogy
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-23T16:05:17Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-23T16:05:17Z-
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn13872842
dc.identifier.urihttps://osnascholar.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/unios/6890-
dc.description.abstractOn the one hand, it is commonly agreed that we make choices in which we are guided by a core of personal commitments, wishes, feelings, etc. that we take to express who we are. On the other, it is commonly agreed that some of these `existential' choices constitute who we are. When confronting these two matters, the question of agency inevitably arises: Whether and in what sense can we choose ourselves? The paper will argue for a new perspective on existential choice.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSPRINGER
dc.relation.ispartofCONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY REVIEW
dc.subjectAUTONOMY
dc.subjectExistential choice
dc.subjectJean-Paul Sartre
dc.subjectMartin Heidegger
dc.subjectMerleau-Ponty
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectReasons
dc.subjectResoluteness
dc.titleExistential choices: to what degree is who we are a matter of choice?
dc.typejournal article
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11007-011-9168-7
dc.identifier.isiISI:000288900900004
dc.description.volume44
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.startpage65
dc.description.endpage79
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0001-9383-7843
dc.publisher.placeVAN GODEWIJCKSTRAAT 30, 3311 GZ DORDRECHT, NETHERLANDS
dcterms.isPartOf.abbreviationCont. Philos. Rev.
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