The where and what of cognition: The untenability of cognitive agnosticism and the limits of the Motley Crew Argument

Autor(en): Walter, Sven 
Kaestner, Lena
Stichwörter: BOUNDS; Cognition; Computer Science; Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence; Extended mind; Functionalism; MIND; Neurosciences; Neurosciences & Neurology; Parity principle; PERCEPTION; Psychology; Psychology, Experimental
Erscheinungsdatum: 2012
Herausgeber: ELSEVIER
Volumen: 13
Ausgabe: 1
Startseite: 12
Seitenende: 23
Cognitive agnosticism is the view that one can fruitfully discuss the pros and cons of what has recently been called the ``extended mind'' in the absence of an account of cognition. The failure to provide a mark of the cognitive should not prevent one from worrying about whether cognitive processes are an intracranial affair only, encompass extracranial parts of the body, or even stretch out into the extrabodily environment. Cognitive agnosticism, we argue, is unsustainable: we have to address the question where cognition is, but in order to do so we have to tackle the question what it is first. But instead of adding our own account to the growing list of suggestions regarding the What-question, we suggest that it may be worthwhile to start with the more general question what kind of concept ``cognition'' could be. Along the way, we will learn something about the limits of a recent objection against cognitive extension sometimes referred to as the ``Motley Crew Argument''. (C) 2010 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved.
ISSN: 13890417
DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.10.001

Show full item record

Page view(s)

Last Week
Last month
checked on Feb 23, 2024

Google ScholarTM