Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGillet, Joris
dc.contributor.authorSchram, Arthur
dc.contributor.authorSonnemans, Joep
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-23T16:11:36Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-23T16:11:36Z-
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn01677187
dc.identifier.urihttps://osnascholar.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/unios/9789-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally investigate how the managerial decision-making process affects choices in a Bertrand pricing game with an opportunity to form non-binding cartels. To do so we compare the effects of three decision-making rules for the firm (decisions by CEOs, majority rule and consensus) to each other and to decisions in a benchmark consisting of single-individual firms. It has been argued elsewhere that groups behave more competitively than individuals. In this setting this predicts that for all three decision-making rules we should observe fewer cartels and lower prices. This is not what we find. For the formation of cartels, there are no differences across treatments. For prices asked, we find that first, cartels lead to higher prices in all treatments, despite the fact that they are non-binding. Second, the decision-making rules strongly affect the prices asked. One thing that stands out is that firms run by CEOs ask higher prices (i.e., defect less often from the cartel) than observed in the other treatments. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherELSEVIER
dc.relation.ispartofINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectBEHAVIOR
dc.subjectBertrand pricing
dc.subjectBusiness & Economics
dc.subjectCartel
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectExperiments
dc.subjectINDIVIDUALS
dc.subjectManagerial decision making
dc.subjectTRUST
dc.titleCartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules
dc.typejournal article
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.03.015
dc.identifier.isiISI:000286854400014
dc.description.volume29
dc.description.issue1, SI
dc.description.startpage126
dc.description.endpage133
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0002-1767-4998
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0001-7545-7409
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0002-3780-3224
dc.contributor.researcheridG-5045-2011
dc.identifier.eissn18737986
dc.publisher.placeRADARWEG 29, 1043 NX AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS
dcterms.isPartOf.abbreviationInt. J. Ind. Organ.
dcterms.oaStatusGreen Submitted
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