Cognitive extension: the parity argument, functionalism, and the mark of the cognitive

Autor(en): Walter, Sven 
Stichwörter: Cognition; Extended cognition; Extended mind; Functionalism; History & Philosophy Of Science; Mark of the cognitive; Parity principle; Philosophy
Erscheinungsdatum: 2010
Herausgeber: SPRINGER
Journal: SYNTHESE
Volumen: 177
Ausgabe: 2
Startseite: 285
Seitenende: 300
Zusammenfassung: 
During the past decade, the so-called ``hypothesis of cognitive extension,'' according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues and their interconnections. Section 1 provides a brief introduction. Section 2 argues that some of the most prominent objections against the appeal to parity considerations fail. Section 3 shows that such considerations are nevertheless unsuitable as an argument for cognitive extension. First, the actual argumentative burden is carried by an underlying commitment to functionalism, not by the parity considerations themselves. Second, in the absence of an independently motivated mark of the cognitive, the argument based on parity considerations does not get off the ground, but given such a mark, it is superfluous. Section 4 argues that a similar dilemma arises for the attempt to defend cognitive extension by a general appeal to functionalism. Unless it can be independently settled what it is for a process to be cognitive, functionalism itself will be undermined by the possibility of cognitive extension. Like parity considerations, functionalism is thus either unable to support cognitive extension or superfluous. Hence, nothing short of the specification of an appropriate mark of the cognitive that can be fulfilled not only by intracranial but also by extended processes will do as an argument for cognitive extension.
ISSN: 00397857
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9844-x

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