New avenues in implementation research: departmental and partisan struggles in tobacco control

Abstract

The European Union has developed an ambitious tobacco policy regime. However, this area shows striking differences in national implementation. Although existing research points to some explanations for member state differences, there is still only limited understanding regarding drivers of differentiated implementation. In this study, a method of difference is followed and the article investigates two cases of `high performers' (United Kingdom, Ireland) and two cases of `laggards' (Germany, Austria). In order to explain the differences regarding tobacco control strictness, three explanatory approaches are combined. First, taking a party differences approach, an in-depth analysis of the party positions is conducted, using Comparative Manifesto Data. Second, using a functional approach, policy implementation is assumed to be influenced by portfolio allocation. If the competence for implementing policy lies with economic or agricultural departments, a more liberal approach is expected than if it lies with the health department. Third, a turf approach is used: if the health department has the sole competence for the implementation, stricter (and also more dynamic) regulation is expected than if two or more departments must reach a consensus. Combining administrative science and politics approaches in an innovative way, the article provides novel insights on differentiated implementation.